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Abstract: Anthony Ashley Cooper Shaftesbury (1671-1713), the British Enlightenment philosopher, 
put on the agenda the practice of philosophy. The most important Modern Socratic made philosophy 
important for this happiness-driven century in a way that his contemporaries could not. Not only did 
he use philosophy to educate a new class of citizens, but he made philosophy necessary for virtue and 
virtue indispensable for happiness. In contradistinction to his tutor, John Locke, and his followers 
who made pleasure the content of happiness, Shaftesbury’s combined neo-Stoicism and neo-
Aristotelianism accounted for his equating virtue with happiness, thus making of philosophy as "the 
study of happiness" a necessity for all.  
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Resumen: Anthony Ashley Cooper Shaftesbury (1671-1713), filósofo ilustrado ingles, agendó 
dentro de su obra la práctica de la filosofía. El socrático más relevante de la modernidad hizo de la 
filosofía algo relevante para estos siglos focalizados en la felicidad. No sólo usó la filosofía para 
educar a un nuevo tipo de ciudadanos sino que la convirtió en un instrumento necesario para alcanzar 
la virtud e hizode la virtud un elemento indispensable para la felicidad. En oposición a su tutor, John 
Locke, y a sus seguidores, quienes forjaron al placer como la base de la felicidad, la combinación de 
neo-estoicismo y neo-aristotelismo de  Shaftesbury igualaron virtud y felicidad y así transformó a la 
filosofía, entendida como “estudio de la felicidad”, en una necesidad básica. 





Philosophical practitioners who search for antecedents of their work 
usually point to Greek and Hellenistic philosophies. The Enlightenment is 
the proximate source of the current practice of philosophy, however, 
granted that the Enlightenment’s revival of Hellenistic philosophy is a 
subject to fathom. This article introduces the practical vision of 
philosophy held by the most important Socratic of the Modern era, the 
British Enlightenment philosopher Anthony Ashley Cooper Shaftesbury 
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(1671-1713). In order to do justice to his innovative vision of philosophy, 
I introduce it against the background of the representative thought of his 
age. To that purpose, I briefly outline the Enlightenment's revolutionary 
view of reason and happiness, elaborate on its most important 
philosopher (also Shaftesbury's mentor), John Locke, and trace the latter's 
influence on other eighteenth-century philosophers. I present 
Shaftesbury's practical philosophy and his controversy with Locke and 
his followers. Finally, I assess the Shaftesburean legacy by comparing the 
thought British Enlightenment philosopher's thought with the 
contemporary practice of philosophy using four criteria: audience, 
politics, happiness, and virtue. 
 
 
The Enlightenment: John Locke and its followers 
 
The roots of many of the features of modern culture are found in the ideas 
of the Enlightenment. This Europeanwide, eighteenth-century movement 
is described by Immanuel Kant as "man's release from his self-incurred 
tutelage", from his inability to use innate understanding without guidance 
from another person. The Enlightenment stressed the autonomy of reason 
as the tool through which human thought and action may be explored. 
The individual who generated ideas thought in an enlightened way.  
The term Enlightenment has become most closely associated with 
France, where thinkers such as Voltaire argued for the primacy of reason. 
Their purpose was to "regenerate" humankind, to emphasize the 
superiority of what Jean Jacques Rousseau called "the greatest happiness 
of all" over individual concerns. In his Happiness: A History, Darrin M. 
McMahon explains this characteristic of the Enlightenment: “Whereas 
classical sages had aimed to cultivate a rarified ethical elite––attempting 
to bring happiness to a select circle of disciples, or at most to the active 
citizens of the polis––Enlightenment visionaries dreamed of bringing 
happiness to entire societies and even to humanity as a whole”1. 
Enlightened authors wrote more about happiness than any previous 
period in western history. In doing so, they hoped to break with all 
                                                          
1 MCMAHON, Darrin M.: Happiness: A History, Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, NY (USA), 
2006, p. 212.  
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previous norms, dispelling the mystery and mystique that had surrounded 
the concept of happiness for centuries. Whereas earlier ages had cloaked 
it in religion or fate, Enlightenment authors would unveil it in its natural 
purity. And whereas previous ages had searched for happiness in faith, 
enlightened observers would aim to see it clearly in its own right.”2  
From the combined precedents of Renaissance humanism and 
innovative Christian theology, influential voices drew conclusions on the 
possibility of pleasure and felicity on earth. Neither the reward of the 
next world nor the gift of good fortune or the gods, happiness was above 
all an earthly affair, to be achieved in the here and now through human 
agency alone. The work of forging this new conception, which contrasted 
both with the tragic and the Christian condition, was a collective 
enterprise, elaborated slowly over the course of centuries3. But for many 
Enlightenment thinkers, such as Jean Le Rond D'Alembert, Isaac 
Newton's physics and John Locke's metaphysics taken together presented 
a portrait of nature that convinced their more radical interpreters that, 
when allowed to run as it should, the world was leading us on a happy 
course4. Locke revealed the universal laws that governed the workings of 
thought which, bearing on his views on happiness, constitutes the 
backgroud against which his dissident pupil, Shaftesbury, developed 
another vision of happiness that will make philosophy a practical 
discipline. 
In the opening book of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding  
(1689), the British philosopher supplied a critique of innate ideas and 
principles and set out an empirical basis for knowledge5. His rejection of 
innate ideas and the idea of tabula rasa wiped our slate free of sin. A 
                                                          
2 MCMAHON, Darrin M.: Happiness: A History, Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, NY (USA),  
p. 212.  
3 For the Christian vision of happiness, see MCMAHON, Darrin M.: Happiness: A History, Atlantic 
Monthly Press, New York, NY (USA), 2006. For the vision embodied in Greek tragedies, see 
NUSSBAUM, Martha C.: The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and 
Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), 1986.   
4 D’ALEMBERT, Jean Le Rond: Preliminary Discourses to the Encyclopédia of Diderot, SHWAB,  
Richard N. (translation and introduction), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL (USA) and 
London (UK), 1995 [1751], pp. 81-83.  
5 See CAREY, Daniel: Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson: Contesting Diversity in the 
Enlightenment and Beyond. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), 2006, chapter 2.  
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Calvinist by birth who never completely renounced his faith, Locke 
always retained a healthy understanding of the human potential for 
egotism and self-regard, yet rejected the idea of Calvinist sin.   
His theory of mind dealt a crushing blow to the view that individuals 
were inherently deficient, tending naturally towards corruption. And if 
not impeded by original sin, what as to prevent them from successfully 
pursuing happiness?  
 In the chapter "Power" in Book 2 of the Essay, Locke employs the 
phrase "the pursuit of happiness" four times. The force that draws people 
near and moves them is "happiness and that alone". The "general Desire 
of Happiness operates constantly and invariably" upon all human beings, 
keeping them forever in motion6. Happiness is a sort of emotional 
gravity, a universal force which moves desire. Desire is "scarce 
distinguishable from" uneasiness––Locke's term for "all pain of the 
body" and "disquiet of the mind". As we are continually attracted to 
pleasure and continually repulsed by pain, "Happiness then in its full 
extent is the utmost Pleasure we are capable of, and Misery the utmost 
pain"7.   
 Whereas Christian moralists had argued for centuries that pleasure 
was dangerous, and pain our natural lot, Locke reversed this proposition. 
God had designed human beings to seek pleasure and feel pain naturally, 
he claimed. And this was as it should be: "Pleasure in us, is what we call 
Good, and what is apt to produce Pain in us, we call Evil"8. Thus, "in 
Locke's divinely orchestrated universe, pleasure was providential. It 
helped lead to God"9.   
 Locke mitigated his hedonism, however, by emphasizing that 
through reason, the "true candle of the Lord", human beings could be 
                                                          
6 LOCKE, John: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, NIDDITCH, Paul (ed.), Oxford, UK:  
Clarendon Press, 1991 [1689], pp. 258, 283.  
7 LOCKE, John: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, NIDDITCH, Paul (ed.), Oxford, UK: 
Clarendon Press, 1991 [1689], p. 258.  
8 LOCKE, John: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, NIDDITCH, Paul (ed.), Oxford, UK:  
Clarendon Press, 1991 [1689], p. 259.  
9 MCMAHON, Darrin M.: "Pursuing an Enlightened Gospel: From Deism to Materialism to 
Atheism", in FITZPATRICK, Martin, JONES, Peter, KNELLWOLF, Christa, and MCCALMAN, 
Ian (eds.), The Enlightenment World, Routledge, New York, NY (USA), 2004, pp. 164-176.  
9 LOCKE, John: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, NIDDITCH, Paul (ed.), Oxford, UK:  
Clarendon Press, 1991 [1689], p. 274.    
HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 6, 2015, pp. 81-101  
SHAFTESBURY AS A PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHER 85 
persuaded to take a long view of their happiness. Moreover, he continued 
to see the highest happiness as that of the world to come, unable, like 
many, to dispense with the Christian doctrine of ultimate rewards9.   
The influence of Locke's view of happiness explains the primacy of 
pleasure in eighteenth century thought10. Along with Baruch Spinoza, 
Locke influenced materialistic theories, such as Julien Offray de La 
Mettrie's and Paul-Henri Thiry Baron d'Holbach's 11. 
 Julien Offray de La Mettrie describes in Man a Machine (1947) 
organic machines composed of matter endowed with the ability to think. 
As human beings are more advanced than animals and plants, but not 
different in kind, they should follow the dictates of nature. They are 
simply machines intended for happiness. Pleasure is the same as 
sensuality, which is the same as happiness: it is always the same feeling, 
only its duration and intensity differs. The more long-lasting, delicious, 
enticing, uninterrupted and untroubled this feeling is, the happier one 
is12.  
Another example is Paul-Henri Thiry Baron d'Holbach, whose 
Système de la nature is a materialist and atheist tract. Sharing La 
Mettrie's materialism, Holbach refuses to leave any space at all for spirit 
or soul. The idea of God is an obstacle for our well-being. Happiness, 
measured exclusively in pleasure's terms, is the reward of freeing 
ourselves from God. Released from repression, guilt and false belief, 
pleasure can finally flow free13.   
                                                          
10 See PORTER, Roy: "Enlightenment Pleasure", in PORTER, Roy and MULVEY ROBERTS, 
Marie (eds.), Pleasure in the Eighteenth Century, New York University Press, New York, NY 
(USA), 1996.  
11 For Locke’s influence on the French Materialists, see YOLTON, John W.: Locke and French 
Materialism, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991.  
12 LA METTRIE, Julien Offray de: Anti-Seneca or the Sovereign Good, in THOMSON, Ann (ed. and 
trans.), Machine Man and Other Writings (1996) Cambridge (UK), Cambridge University Press, 
1750, p. 120.  
13 Holbach differentiated himself from La Mettrie's egoism, however, by maintaining that "Nature", 
flanked by "virtue", "reason", and "truth", will reveal to all right-thinking minds that happiness lies in 
more than the subjective fulfilment of individual desire. "Man cannot be happy without virtue", 
where virtue is defined as our willingness to "communicate happiness" to others (HOLBACH, Paul 
Henri Thiry, Baron d’: OEuvres Philosophiques, JACKSON, Jean-Pierre (ed.), 3 vols., édition Alive, 
Paris, 1999. Vol. II, p. 358). It is in our self-interest to serve the interests of those around us. By 
making our fellows happy, so we render ourselves. This conclusion was shared by Denis Diderot and 
the Utilitarians; yet, as Charles Taylor notes, it is in no way obvious and does not follow from the 
HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 6, 2015, pp. 81-101 
LYDIA B. AMIR 
 
86
In making these claims about the centrality of pleasure, Holbach and 
La Mettrie are drawing self-consciously on the tradition of the Greek 
philosopher, Epicurus, as did before them Locke, albeit through the 
writings of the French priest Pierre Gassendi 14. For all his endorsement 
of pleasure, Epicurus was no hedonist, however, but rather an ascetic, 
who counselled a rigorous curtailment of desire so as to steel the self 
against disturbance, and guard against self-inflicted pain. The aim of the 
Epicurean sage is ataraxic, the freedom from anxiety, the minimization 
of pain15. Whilst philosophy is helpful for Epicurean happiness, I argue, 
it is not necessary for hedonism. Thus, the sigificance of happiness in the 
Enlightenment's thought was not sufficient to make philosophy a 
practical activity, because of the pervasive view of pleasure as the 
content of happiness held by Locke and his followers. It is to 
Shaftesbury, Locke's dissident pupil, to whom we should turn in order to 




Shaftesbury as a Practical Philosopher 
 
Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713), was 
raised and educated in his grandfather's household by John Locke, 
according to the principles laid in the latter’s Some Thoughts Concerning 
Education. Anthony's grandfather founded the Whig party, which he 
                                                                                                                                   
premises of Holbach and company. If human being are pleasure-seeking machines, corrupted by 
nature to maximize their own enjoyment at every turn, why should they work to maximize the 
pleasure of their fellows? See TAYLOR, Charles: Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern 
Identity. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA (USA), 1989, pp. 329-327.  
14 La Mettrie paid repeated and open homage to Epicurus in such works as The System of Epicurus, 
The Art of Enjoying Oneself, The School of Sensual Pleasure, and the Anti-Seneca (also entitled The 
Discourse on Happiness). In The Art of Enjoying Oneself, he distinguishes however between the 
vulgar hedonist, who favours abundance without conscience, and the philosophic hedonist, who 
chooses quality with consciousness.  
15 Defying the more general classical tendency to separate matter and mind, Epicurus, and more 
explicitly his Roman successor Lucretius, had taught that the world was a swirling mass of atoms 
which comprised both body and soul. The soul was not a substance apart, nor was it intended for an 
afterlife. When one accepted this basic truth, Epicurus argued, one could dispel the false fears of 
divine punishment or eternal damnation that caused us continual anxiety and pain, allowing us to 
focus instead on the more enlightened goal of attaining pleasure.  
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generally supported although not unconditionally so. Reviving the ancient 
ideal of the active philosophical life, Shaftesbury attempted to harmonize 
a political life with a philosophical one, alternating between intense 
public service and periods of philosophical retreats, up until he 
abandoned London for health reasons (1711). Shaftesbury founded the 
"moral sense" school of ethics, according to which natural affection for 
virtue predisposes human beings to act virtuously. Although much of 
Shaftesbury’s work differed from the dominant style of philosophical 
discourse of his era and the philosophical tradition since then, his 
philosophy was very much in vogue during the first half of the eighteenth 
century, so much so that Oliver Goldsmith was prompted to write that 
Shaftesbury had "more imitators in Britain than any other writer I 
know"16.  
Although he was educated under Locke’s care, Shaftesbury resisted 
the implications of his mentor in his collected writings,  Characteristics 
of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, etc. (1711)17. He returned to a form 
of reasoning favoured by the Ancients, a Neo-Stoicism combined with 
Neo-Aristotelianism with emphasis on Socrates as the founder of these 
schools. The most important Socratic of the Modern times, Shaftesbury 
maintains that “the most ingenious way of becoming foolish is by a 
system”17. Despite the Greek and Roman sources of Shaftesbury’s 
thought, Shaftesbury’s main purpose is to address contemporary needs. 
More interested in reforming the morals, manners and taste of his day 
than in discursive reasoning, he aims to promote liberty by devising a 
cultural program for a post-courtly European culture. To this end, he 
criticizes the court, ridicules the church, and rebukes contemporary 
philosophy for its aloofness from practical affairs and neglect of its role 
as moral and political educator.  
                                                          
16 GOLDSMITH, Oliver: "The Augustan Age of England", in The Bee 8, Nov. 24 1759. P. 15. 
Shaftesbury not only profoundly influenced eighteenth-century thought in Britain––Hutcheson, 
Butler, Hume, and Adam Smith were all heavily impacted by his concept of the moral sense; but 
Shaftesbury’s work had a significant influence on French deists such as Voltaire and Rousseau; and 
he was influential in Germany through his concept of enthusiasm that impacted the Romantic idea of 
the creative imagination which was held by Lessing, Mendelssohn, Goethe, Herder, and Schiller. 
17 SHAFTESBURY, Anthony Ashley Cooper: Soliloquy, iii, 1; CR I, p. 189.  
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In the notebooks18, Shaftesbury considers three different ways of 
thinking about philosophy: first, subtle speculation, which would put it 
on a par with mathematics and the sciences; second, the study of 
happiness, with happiness conceived as something dependent on external 
goods, and so philosophy itself would be concerned with those external 
goods; third, the study of happiness, with happiness conceived as 
something dependent solely on the mind, as the Stoics taught. 
Shaftesbury is drawn to the last of these, conceiving philosophy as a 
therapeutic activity whose aim is to help us overcome "disquiet, 
restlessness, anxiety".  
Shaftesbury tells us that his “design is to advance something new, or 
at least something different from what is commonly current in 
philosophy and morals”19. Hardly distinguishable from good education, 
philosophy for Shaftesbury is a practical endeavor. He intends to bring 
philosophy back to the everyday world, an aspiration that explains the 
themes, design and style of his work. Like Hobbes and Locke, who 
strengthened their influence by writing in plain language, Shaftesbury 
aims to reach a lay audience unfamiliar with philosophical terminology. 
He endeavors to rescue the philosophical tradition of the Cambridge 
Platonists from their dull and pedantic folio volumes, in order to make it 
available to individuals of culture and sensibility. Bemoaning 
philosophy’s fate in the modern world, Shaftesbury complains that,  
  
She is no longer active in the world nor can hardly, with any advantage, be 
brought on the public stage. We have immured her, poor lady, in colleges and 
                                                          
18 SHAFTESBURY, Anthony Ashley Cooper: The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical 
Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, RAND, Benjamin (ed.), Swan Sonnenschein, London  
(UK), and Macmillan, New York, NY (USA). Reedited, Routledge/Thoemmes Press, London (UK), 
1992 [1900]. The notebooks are journals of self-examination. Organized topically, they offer an 
irregular record of Shaftesbury’s inner life, mostly between 1698 and 1704. They are tools for 
selfinvestigation and also for self-command, amounting to a kind of moral workbook. Shaftesbury 
wrote much of the material in the notebooks while immersed in deep intellectual engagement with 
the Roman Stoics Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. For the notebooks see KLEIN, Lawrence E.: 
Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), 1994, pp. 70-
90. For Shaftesbury as Stoic, see TIFFANY, Esther: "Shaftesbury as Stoic", in Publications of the 
Modern Language Association XXXVIII, 1923, pp. 641-684.   
19 SHAFTESBURY, Anthony Ashley Cooper: Miscellany, III, i; CR II, pp. 251-252.  
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cells, and have set her servilely to such works as those in the mines. Empirics 
and pedantic sophists are her chief pupils20  
 
It appears he convinced his contemporaries of the importance of his 
project, for Joseph Addison, the editor of the Spectator, is a close reader 
of Shaftesbury’s Characteristics, and subscribers are duly informed of 
the paper's policy to bring "philosophy out of closets and libraries, 
schools and colleges, to dwell in clubs and assemblies, at tea-tables and 
in coffee-houses"21. 
Shaftesbury maintains that a more polite approach than the lecture or 
the sermon is required for a more effective philosophy. For Shaftesbury, 
"politeness", a term referring to the conventions of both good manners 
and refined conversation, fulfils the fundamental rhetorical necessity of 
making concessions to the knowledge, interests, and attention span of an 
audience. In this respect, Laurence Klein explains, Shaftesbury aims to 
regulate "style or language by the standard of good company and people 
of the better sort"—members of the English upper orders, wealthy though 
not necessarily landed gentlemen, educated and literate though not 
necessarily learned, men of the world who could naturally be reached 
through humor, playfulness, variety and open-endedness22. Thus, 
Shaftesbury replaces the magisterial manner with a polite form of writing 
that is more informal, miscellaneous, conversational, open-ended and 
skeptical. 
Philosophy, insists Shaftesbury, should make people effective 
participants in the world. Neither an intellectual discipline for specialists 
nor a profession, it is rather wisdom accessible to every thoughtful 
individual: "If philosophy be, as we take it, the study of happiness, must 
not everyone, in some manner or other, either skillfully or unskillfully 
philosophize?"23 In order to philosophize more skillfully, we should 
become more rational, and this is achieved only by using our reason. We 
                                                          
20 SHAFTESBURY, Anthony Ashley Cooper: Moralists, I, 1; CR II, pp. 4-5. 
21 Quoted in BRETT, Richard L.: The Third Earl of Shaftesbury: A Study in Eighteenth-Century 
Literary Theory, Hutchinson’s University Library, London (UK), 1951, p. 41. 
22 KLEIN, Lawrence E.: Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politics, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge (UK), 1994, p. 75; and KLEIN, Lawrence E.: "Introduction", In SHAFTESBURY, 
Anthony, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, etc. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge (UK), 1999, p. xiii. 
23 SHAFTESBURY, Anthony Ashley Cooper: Moralists, iii, 3; CR II, p. 150; see p. 153.  
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may be convinced to use our reason more often, were we to converse 
openly with one another, using wit and humor to convince and especially 
to refute each other. Shaftesbury never doubts that a genuinely free 
interplay of ideas ensures that the best will prevail; only bad ideas suffer 
when subjected to free and humorous treatment: 
 
I can very well suppose men may be frightened out of their wits, but I have no 
apprehension they should be laughed out of them. I can hardly imagine that in 
a pleasant way they should ever be talked out of their love for society, or 
reasoned out of humanity and common sense. A mannerly wit can hurt no 
cause or interest for which I am in the least concerned; and philosophical 
speculations, politely managed, can never surely render mankind more 
unsociable or uncivilized24  
 
Philosophy is a practical activity in pursuit of moral self-knowledge and 
moral transformation. Virtue is a noble enthusiasm that forms an inward 
harmonious beauty. This sort of morality cannot be taught directly, but 
rather necessitates an indirect approach. As no one likes admonition, 
humor is necessary for an author intended on giving moral advice, as 
well as for the inward conversation of soliloquy, whose purpose is self-
criticism and self-maturation. Finally, humor is necessary for 
conversation, because rationality is furthered through the use of reason, 
reason in turn is developed through criticism, and only humorous 
criticism is effective because it overcomes resistance. Thus humor plays 
an important role in solliloquy, conversation, and writing.   
Becoming moral involves becoming a kind of "self-improving artist". 
The "wise and able Man" is he who "having righter models in his eye, 
becomes in truth the architect of his own life and fortune"25. 
Shaftesbury’s moral theory culminates in an aesthetics of creative 
"inward form", and his legacy is none other than the Greek idea of the 
beauty of morals.   
Stoic reflection on the beauty of the universe established a principle 
of order in the creation which was matched by the unity of human nature, 
evident in shared convictions in matters of taste, morality, and a 
recognition of the divine. Shaftesbury reasserts the notion of innateness, 
                                                          
24 SHAFTESBURY, Anthony Ashley Cooper: Essay, ii, 3; CR I, p. 65. 
25 SHAFTESBURY, Anthony Ashley Cooper: Moralists, iii, 2; CR II, p. 144.  
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attempting to shield it from Locke’s critique by insisting on the existence 
of natural disposition toward virtue. He rejects Locke’s unsociable 
portrait of human beings as motivated by self-interest. Shaftesbury not 
only objects to Locke’s views on innateness, he also turns against his 
positive theory of morals. In particular, the assumption that mankind 
requires rewards and punishments to maintain any degree of moral 
commitment offends him. Locke has situated human beings as appetitive 
agents who merely obeyed the law prudently, but for Shaftesbury 
disinterestedness is consonant with our nature. Locke relies increasingly 
on Scripture to remedy the deficiencies of human reason, that is, the 
failure to pursue notions of duty with adequate attention. Shaftesbury’s 
anti-clerical stance leads him to make religion a moral affair, but it is not 
dependent on a revealed text.  
In characterizing human nature, Shaftesbury turned decisively 
against the Epicurean tradition he associated with Hobbes and Locke. In 
his correspondence Shaftesbury suggests that there are only two real 
schools of philosophy in antiquity: a hedonist tradition uniting Epicurus 
and the Cyrenaics, and a Socratic tradition uniting Academics, 
Peripatetics, and Stoics27. For Shaftesbury, Aristotle and the Stoics are 
part of a single Socratic philosophical tradition united by their 
commitment to virtue and rejection of pleasure as the telos. 
Shaftesbury seeks to reinstate some forms of innateness in order to 
guarantee a distinction between virtue and vice which was rooted in 
nature. In particular, Shaftesbury reintroduces the Stoic notion of 
"prolepsis". A prolepsis was a natural "anticipation" or inclination which 
made it possible to recognize certain ideas or to hold certain beliefs. 
Effectively, it was an innate idea or common notion, but which did not 
guarantee moral knowledge per se. The "prolepsis" supplied criteria, but 
required some cultivation and development, which the practice of 
philosophy should provide.   
In his answer to the critique of innateness, Shaftesbury reinstates 
norms of sociability, moral affection, and the divine, inspired by a Stoic 
conception of human nature that identified internal resources in the form 
of prolepses. Recalling his opponents to a more sociable norm 
characterized by a certain levity in religious conflicts, his allowance for 
ongoing dispute in religion is dependent on preserving a territory of 
HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 6, 2015, pp. 81-101 
LYDIA B. AMIR 
 
92
genuine agreement which he located in human nature and its inbuilt 
tendency to recognize principles of virtue, design, order, and beauty.        
Yet, and this is the crucial part of my argument, in order to form virtue or 
taste, criticism is necessary together with practice and cultivation. And, 
following Epictetus' view of ethics, reason was required to ensure the 
"right application of the affections". Thus, philosophy as a guide to better 
reasoning is necessary in order to educate moral agents. Philosophy is 
necessary for virtue, and as virtue constitutes happiness, philosophy in 
turn is necessary for happiness. Moreover, philosophy is also sufficient 
for happiness, according to Shaftesbury, as the mark of religion was 
ethics alone28.   
The view that makes philosophy necessary for happiness 
distinguishes Shaftesbury from the majority of the Enlightenment's 
thinkers26, I argue. This controversy begins with Locke, whose 
hedonistic, as opposed to Epicurean, view of happiness makes 
philosophy unecessary for the reach of happiness.   
Shaftesbury’s conception of civility and politeness supports a 
narrower interest than Locke’s, however. To be sociable was to be a part 
of an elevated collective, a body of like-minded individuals who 
achieved a consensus on moral, social, and political questions. 
Sociability, like taste, resulted from the cultivation of innate capacities 
and would not be achieved by all. Shaftesbury’s account of sociability, as 
Hans-Georg Gadamer pointed out, has more in common with the German 
concept of Bildung, a process of raising up30. Indeed, Shaftesbury's 
philosophy is at the origin of this concept, as was recently shown by 
                                                          
26 He was emulated, among others, by Adam Smith. True happiness, Smith believed, showing his 
partial indebtedness to the Stoics, lay in "tranquility and enjoyment", which had less to do with 
economic condition that it did with virtue (SMITH, Adam: Theory of Moral Sentiments, RAPHAEL,  
D.D. and MACFIE, A. L. (eds.), Liberty Classics, Indianapolis, IN (USA), 1987. P. 149; see 
GRISWOLD, Jr., Charles A.: Adam Smith and the Virtues of the Enlightenment, Cambridge  
University Press, Cambridge (UK), 1999, pp. 217-227. Far from laying in wealth, the "beggar who 
suns himself by the side of the highway" may well possess the same happiness as kings (SMITH, 
Adam: Theory of Moral Sentiments, RAPHAEL, D.D. and MACFIE, A. L. (eds.), Liberty Classics, 
Indianapolis, IN (USA), 1987, p. 185. Thomas Jefferson, who studied closely Adam Smith’s Theory 
of Moral Sentiments, observed toward the end of his career that "happiness is the aim of life, but 
virtue is the foundation of happiness", echoing Benjamin Franklin’s observation that "virtue and 
happiness are mother and daughter” (quoted by MCMAHON, Darrin M.: Happiness: A History, 
Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, NY (USA), 2006, p. 330.  
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Rebekka Horlacher31. I would like to probe other ways in which 
Shaftesbury is a precursor of the current practice of philosopher as well 
as ways in which he differs from it. 
 
Shaftesbury and the Contemporary Practice of Philosophy 
 
Darrin M. McMahon sums up the Enlightenment's view of happiness as 
follows: 
 
No less an enlightened figure that Voltaire continually paid deference to the 
contingency and uncertainty of human experience, refusing to discount entirely 
the "fatality of evil." Similarly, Immanuel Kant, the celebrated author of "What 
is Enlightenment?" mocked the facile association of happiness with reason and 
virtue, even denying that happiness was the goal of the human life. But many 
persons of the time saw happiness in nature where previous centuries had seen 
salvation in God. Convinced of the natural harmony of the universe, and of 
humankind's ability to control it, they put forth a world in which happiness was 
part of the order of things. Human beings could be happy, they believed; they 
should be happy. And if they were not, then something was wrong––with their 
institutions, their beliefs, their bodies, their minds. In this respect, at least, we 
continue to walk in the Enlightenment's way27  
 
As far as happiness is concerned, we continue to walk in the 
Enlightenment's way. What is, then, the relation of the current practice of 
philosophy with the Enlightenment's goal of happiness? And, more 
specifically, with Shaftesbury's view of happiness as virtue? I propose to 
answer these questions with the use of four criteria: audience, politics, 
happiness, and virtue.  
Audience: When philosophical practitioners search for antecedents of 
their work, they tend to refer to Greek and Hellenistic philosophies. But 
Greek philosophers were not egalitarian in relation to philosophy: 
Socrates used to choose very carefully his students and practiced in their 
presence his elenchus mostly on prominent men of the city; his goal was 
to reveal publicly their ignorance in order to allow his students to infer 
their own ignorance. Plato believed philosophy was for the few, and 
                                                          
27 MCMAHON, Darrin M.: "Pursuing an Enlightened Gospel: From Deism to Materialism to 
Atheism", in FITZPATRICK, Martin, JONES, Peter, KNELLWOLF, Christa, and MCCALMAN, 
Ian (eds.), The Enlightenment World, Routledge, New York, NY (USA), 2004, p. 175. 
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Aristotle clearly considered the theoretical life of the philosopher-
scientist superior to the moral life which is accessible if not to all, at least 
to those who can appreciate the good and the beautiful. Hellenistic 
philosophers emphasized the gulf between the wise and the fool, the 
philosopher and the vulgar. True, in Roman times, philosophy was 
widely popular, partly due to the relaxation of Hellenistic philosophies' 
requirements. But those very relaxations were dubious, as was the 
tendency to refer to philosophers as gurus, with the cult of personality 
that followed and the dependence this created28. For these reasons, 
Hellenistic philosophies should neither be idealized nor taken as the sole 
source of the practice of philosophy.  
I suggest that the proximate source of the current practice of 
philosophy is the Enlightenment, granted that the Enlightenment’s 
revival of Hellenistic philosophy is a subject to fathom29. The 
Enlightenment is rarely mentioned in the literature on Philosophical 
Practice, maybe because of the criticism to which its view of reason is 
submitted in Post-modernism. The Enlightenment is significant for the 
practice of philosophy, however, because the democratization of 
philosophy from the eighteenth century onwards has been instrumental in 
creating a new class of educated citizens. Today, we are heir to the 
Enlightenment's goal in that the practice of philosophy can be offered to 
all in its meliorist rather than perfectionist mode30. This follows the 
Enlightement's view of happiness rather than Shaftesbury's, and it is a 
boon which also limits philosophy's ambitions. This point is further 
clarified through thinking on the relation between politics and 
philosophy.  
Politics: In her impressive discussion of Hellenistic philosophies in 
The Therapy of Desire, Martha Nussbaum criticizes them for their 
blindness about the importance of politics and their attempt to perfect 
individuals one by one, "as if perfect people could in fact be produced 
                                                          
28 See AMIR, Lydia B.: "¿Que Podemos Aprender de la Filosofia Helenista?", in Sophia: Revista de 
Filosofia 5, 2009, pp. 81-89. Much longer English version found in www.revistasophia.com, 2009, 
pp. 1-32.  
29 See LONG, Anthony A: Hellenistic Philosophy, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA 
(USA), 1986.   
30 See AMIR, Lydia B.: "Taking Philosophy Seriously: Perfectionism versus Meliorism", in 
BARRIENTOS RASTROJO, Jose (ed.): Philosophical Practice, X-XI, Sevilla (Spain), 2006, pp. 11- 
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without profound changes in material and institutional conditions"31. 
Although these philozophers are keen to salvage the ideal of philosophic 
self-sufficiency, she claims that the success of their enterprise awaits and 
requires political and social alterations.   
To the contrary, Shaftesbury furthered political changes in England 
which facilitated the relations between politics and philosophy. Those 
changes promoted the discipline of philosophy as education for a new 
class of citizens and witty rational discussion as a novel form of popular 
conversation. In attempting a more profound transformation on himself 
according to Stoic ideals as witnessed in his notebooks, however, 
Shaftesbury reached the conclusion that the philosophical self always 
loses to the social self, which prompted him to renounce the political life 
in order to perfect himself. His view of philosophy restricted its benefits 
to the "club" or the small group, which was also the reality of Hellenistic 
philosophies.  
Philosophic advancement is usually more radical than the progress 
embodied by laws, and in this sense, I suggest, it is superior, although 
laws make it available at least in principle to more persons. The 
contemporary dismissal of the ideal of sovereignty, with its emphasis on 
societal rules and political laws, is yet another manner to undermine the 
potency of philosophy. Perfectionist visions of philosophy should not be 
given up, however, especially since the eighteenth century onwards 
according to John Passmore in The Perfectibility of Man we understand 
by this term a gradual, rather than a radical, change32.   
Happiness: Happiness already possessed a long history by the 
eighteenth century, yet the idea that institutions should be expected to 
promote it, and that people should expect to receive it in this life, was a 
tremendous novelty. It involved nothing less than a revolution in human 
expectations, while raising, in turn, delicate questions: Just who, 
precisely, was worthy of happiness? Was it for all? Was happiness a right 
or a reward?   
Today, happiness has become a research field of the social sciences, 
including psychology, thanks to the recent field of positive psychology. 
                                                          
31 NUSSBAUM, Martha C.: The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ (USA), 1994, p. 505.  
32 PASSMORE, John: The Perfectibility of Man, Duckworth, London (UK), 1970, p. 157.  
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The social sciences concentrate on (subjective) well-being33; yet 
happiness is not the same as well-being; and, happiness is certainly 
different from another fashionable tenet––the willed well-being called 
positive thinking34 35. Eudaimonia or happiness includes an objective, 
optimal condition for human beings, and does not simply consist in 
subjective feelings of contentment36. Happiness has a normative 
compound, which is fulfilled by discipline, frustration, and hard work. 
The flower of a life well-lived, it is not a right but an achievement.   
Virtue: Closely related to the issue of happiness is the issue of its 
contents, whether in terms of pleasure or virtue. Locke foresaw the 
current situation when he described the possibility, which he wanted to 
rule out, that each person will find pleasure in something different and 
call that happiness37. In order to avoid this relativistic outcome Locke 
                                                          
33 For well-being and subjective well-being as objects of contemporary scientific research, see EID, 
Michael and Randy L. LARSEN (eds.): The Science of Subjective Well-Being, Guilford Press,  
London (UK), 2008; HUPPERT, Felicia A., BAYLIS, Nick, and KEVERNE, Barry (eds.): The 
Science of Well-Being, Oxford University Press, Oxford (UK), 2003; and DIENER, Ed, and 
BISWAS-DIENER, Robert: Happiness: Unlocking the Mysteries of Psychological Wealth,  
Blackwell, New York, NY (USA), 2008. Another version of happiness, which translates eudaimonia 
as personal expressiveness, has been recently added by positive psychologists such as Alan S. 
Waterman. Eudaimonia indeed captures the sense of "happiness", as Richard Kraut argues, and 
should thus compete with happiness as personal well-being; it is not (relative) personal 
expressiveness, however; this seems to be a mistranslation into psychological terms that can be 
assessed or measured in research. See WATERMAN, Alan S.: "Personal Expressiveness 
(eudaimonia) and Hedonic Enjoyment", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 64(4), April 
1993, pp. 678-691. KRAUT, Richard: "Two Conceptions of Happiness", in The Philosophical 
Review 99, 1979, pp. 167-197.  
34 For positive thinking, see FLETCHER, Horace: Happiness as Found in Forethought Minus 
Fearthought, Stone, London (UK), 1897; and the best-seller of PEALE, Norman Vincent: The Power 
of Positive Thinking, New York, NY (USA), Prentice-Hall,   
35 . For a deadly criticism of positive thinking, see EHRENREICH, Barbara: Bright-Sided: How 
Positive Thinking is Undermining America, Picador, New York, NY (USA), 2009.  
36 See KRAUT, Richard: "Two Conceptions of Happiness", in The Philosophical Review 99, 1979, 
pp. 167-197. For philosophic views of happiness, see MCGILL, V. J.: The Idea of Happiness, New 
York, NY (USA), Frederick A. Praeger, 1967; QUENNELL, Peter: The Pursuit of Happiness, 
Constable, London (UK), 1988; and BOK, Sissela: Exploring Happiness: From Aristotle to Brain 
Science, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT (USA) and London (UK), 2010. Valuable work has 
been conducted in other languages than English. See, for exemple, in French, COMTE-SPONVILLE, 
André: Le Bonheur, désespérément, éditions Pleins Feux, Paris, 2000; and LENOIR, Frédéric: Du 
bonheur: Un voyage philosophique, Fayard, Paris, 2013.   
37 LOCKE, John: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, NIDDITCH, Paul (ed.), Oxford, UK:  
Clarendon Press, 1991 [1689], p. 258.  
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relied on punishments and rewards in the afterlife, making thereby more 
room for religion that Shaftesbury thought necessary.   
It seems that today Shaftesbury has lost his combat against 
hedonism. And, in contradiction to Epicureans who need their desires 
pruned, hedonists make philosophy redundant for happiness. Philosophy 
could make a difference today through the renewed Shaftesburean 
assertion that virtue is happiness. This may give an edge to philosophical 
practitioners in their relation to life-coaches and psychologists, who are 
not trained in ethics and are not familiar in particular with virtue ethics38. 
Those who emphasize the importance of virtue today are mostly religious 
persons, however, who turn to religion instead than to philosophy. Even 
those philosophers who adhere to virtue ethics do not currently 
understand it as requiring working on desires and emotions––a 
philosophic work––but mainly as involving acceptance of one's emotions 
and desires39. Moreover, if philosophers were ready to maintain with 
Shaftesbury that virtue is happiness, they would have to give a personal 
example, which most philosophers are reluctant or unable to give. And, 
this would require the willingness to embrace a vision of happiness that 
necessitates philosophic reflection, discipline, and commitment, which 
may come across as difficult to achieve by many persons. In spite of 
these difficulties, I  believe that this space is where a perfectionist vision 
of happiness, in contradistinction to the social sciences' view of well-








                                                          
38 See AMIR, Lydia B.: "Morality, Psychology, Philosophy", in Philosophical Practice 1(1), 2005. 
Pp. 43-57; and AMIR, Lydia B.: "Philosophers, Ethics, and Emotions", in Philosophical Practice 
4(2), 2009, pp. 447-458.  
39 NUSSBAUM, Martha C.: The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ (USA), 1994, p. 466.  
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